We examine moderators of the impact of cognitive load on choice strategies and susceptibility to decision bias. In four studies, we investigate the conditions under which load increases the compromise effect. Overall, our research shows that the ultimate influence of load on bias is contingent on motivational factors that determine how choice processes would have progressed under conditions of no load. Our findings indicate that there is no de facto impact of load on bias.
1989; Gilbert et al. 1988 ; for discussion, see Petty and Wegener 1997) , namely that load will increase the incidence of bias because load interferes with conscious System 2 monitoring and adjustment processes (Kahneman 2003) . For example, a person who lacks System 2 resources may tend to rely on contextual properties (e.g. relative positions of options in a set) and fail to correct for the fact that these properties are independent of preferences and normatively irrelevant to the choice. However, as shown below, the effects of load also depend on how resources would have been used under no load (i.e., at baseline). That is, the effects of load on bias depend on what specific information and cognitive operations load blocks. Accordingly, in our view, a correction model is overly simplistic.
Instead, we adopt a "selection" model. In a selection model, the idea that load disrupts System 2 processes and increases reliance on System 1 outputs is, in isolation, insufficient to discern the influence of resource constraints on bias. It is also necessary to know which system is associated with the bias and the motivation of the decision-maker to rely on that system. Our view corresponds to Sloman's (1996, p. 18) view that load can increase or decrease bias depending on the task at hand, in particular depending on the extent to which accurate task performance requires System 2 or System 1 processing. However, our selection model extends Sloman's in an important way: Whereas the standard selection model focuses on "intuitive" tasks that are more amenable to System 1 processing (e.g., taste; Wilson and Schooler 1991; see Sloman 1996) , we focus on motivational factors that create conditions which select for more versus less fruitful uses of available System 2 resources.
Prior research on the attention and effort devoted to decision-making has heavily implicated peoples' motivation to use available resources (Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Petty and Cacioppo 1986) . Thus, studying the effects of load in combination with the effects of motivation is essential for understanding the influence of resources on decision bias. A very important way in which motivation is likely to interact with load is in its determination of how resources are used when they are not restricted. Decision-makers vary in their basic motivation to rely on simpler versus more complex decision strategies, even when unencumbered by load.
When someone is not sufficiently motivated to engage resources but such resources are nonetheless available, what might result is not only a greater relative reliance on more simplistic associative processes (System 1), but also on overly simplistic rule-based processes (System 2).
In particular, System 2 might continue to operate, but the nature of the rules employed might qualitatively change from more elaborate, such as those representing an effortful attempt to match option characteristics to idiosyncratic preferences and constraints (e.g., "Compare the presented options with my ideal option"), to more simplistic, such as choosing an option that is best on a single attribute or is in the compromise position (e.g., "Compare the presented options"). The answer to the question of how resources affect bias, then, is contingent on people's motivation in the absence of load to make use of certain strategies, in particular strategies based on pre-stored preference information versus local, relational information.
To understand the effects of load in detail, we must pinpoint the specific kinds of processes associated with each system in specific task contexts. Despite increasing methodological use of cognitive load tasks (see general discussion), research has not generated a systematic account of load's effects and how these effects arise. Some research suggests that load causes people to rely less on pre-stored information (e.g., preferences and goals). For example, Ward and Mann (2000) showed that chronic dieters consume significantly more highcalorie food under load. They theorized that load disinhibits the eating behavior of dieters by preventing them from attending to their self goals (which are presumably stored in memory) and hence appreciating the personal consequences of the decision to eat. Because non-dieters do not have the same goal of restricted eating, load has no effect on them. Drolet and Luce (2004) found decreases in the prominence effect (Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic 1988) in especially emotionladen choice contexts where load apparently disrupts access to self goals necessary for emotion generation. Interestingly, their participants appeared to use more cognitively complex strategies under load. They relied more on tradeoff calculations based on the local attribute value information (given as part of the choice task) than on strategies that rely on the generation of the actual and potential negative emotional consequences associated with trading off attributes with goal implications (e.g., anxiety or regret associated with the attribute "safety"). Given the above research, we proposed that, in the context of the choices we study (see below), load disrupts preference-based decision processing relatively strongly, but local information-based processing relatively minimally. We tested this basic proposition in study 1.
STUDY 1
Study 1 was designed to test our proposition that cognitive load would disrupt consumers' ability to retrieve pre-stored preference information and narrow their attention to the stimuli in front of them, thereby increasing the influence of the most salient decision inputs. The use of pre-stored preference information, such as generalized or global attribute importance assessments (e.g., "Quality is more important than price") (Goldstein 1990) and local evaluative judgments (e.g., "You buy a pair of binoculars only once, so it's worth it to get the highest magnification power") requires that the decision-maker consciously recruit rules or values from memory and draw implications by manipulating that information in working memory. By contrast, the use of local information, such as relational information (e.g., "A is cheaper than B"), complies with the apparent demands of a choice task while minimizing the demands on working memory. We expected that, in a choice task, load will decrease the impact of pre-stored preference information. We thought that, correspondingly, load will enhance the impact of local information (e.g., comparisons among the attribute values of the presented options).
Method
Fifty-two students at a West Coast university were paid $5 to participate in a consumer decision-making study. Participants made choices among three non-dominated product options that were described along two attributes in six categories: restaurants (price and quality), personal computers (price and speed), apartments (distance from work and rent), TV (features and price), microwave oven (power and price), and health clubs (annual fee and distance from home). After making each choice, participants explained their reasons for that choice in writing.
There were two conditions. About half the participants received a memory load manipulation (load condition) whereas the other half did not (no load condition). The load manipulation involved having participants memorize a list of 20 words to be recalled later during the study session (Drolet and Luce 2004) . They were given two minutes to memorize the words.
After making their choices and providing protocols, load participants were asked to recall as many of the words as they could.
Protocol Coding. We developed a protocol coding scheme to test our idea that load differentially disrupts access to and then use of more internal, stored information (e.g., preferences and goals) versus external information (e.g., relative attribute values). In the context of written choice explanations, we expected stored information to be represented as expressions of generalized preference or local evaluation. Generalized preference statements include any expression of the participant's unique goals, desires, habits, or situational constraints. Local evaluation statements cast particular attribute values into the context of the participant's preferences and hence related externally-presented information to stored preferences or goals.
Importantly, these statements presuppose access to internal (stored in memory) information in order to place externally-presented attribute values into the context of the participant's preferences. We sought to contrast these preference-based operations with operations more grounded in externally-presented decision information. Thus, our third category of interest involved local comparison operations. Local comparison operations focus on evaluation or manipulation of two or more pieces of information contained in the external (to the participant) choice set. Note, both local evaluation and local comparison statements involve putting attribute information into context. However, the former evaluates attribute values in the context of stored preferences, whereas the latter evaluates attribute values in the context of one another.
Following the categories above, each thought was assigned to one of four types: a) generalized preferences reflecting the decision-makers' overriding, generic priorities (e.g., "When I go out to dinner I usually like to have a nice wine or sometimes I bring my own wine; it seems to me that a restaurant with a higher star rating and average entrée price would be more likely to have a better wine selection"); b) local evaluation involving a preference-based evaluation of an individual attribute value (e.g., "15 minutes from a health club, that's walking distance; 20 minutes is too far away to walk)"; c) local comparison: explicit comparisons or attribute tradeoffs involving the presented options in the set (e.g., "A has better memory than B"); and d) irrelevant and vague (e.g., "That's the one for me").
We expected that the protocols of participants under load would contain more local evaluation statements (which involve local information only) and less generalized preference and local comparison statements (which involve pre-stored information). Two independent judges coded 312 choice protocols which were parsed into a total of 428 thought statements.
3 Interjudge reliability was 93%. Disagreements were resolved through discussion. We excluded 11 thoughts because they were irrelevant or vague, so there were 417 thoughts for analysis. Across conditions, 21% of thoughts were coded as local comparison, 36% as generalized preference, and 43% as local evaluation. The fact that less than 1% of thought statements fell into the "irrelevant or vague" category indicates that our coding scheme was successful in capturing the range of internally-versus externally-based information used to evaluate these decision problems.
4
Results and Discussion Table 1 shows the relative percentage of thoughts in each thought category by load condition by product category. We estimated three logistic regression models for the use of a: 1) local comparison vs. generalized preference thought; 2) local comparison vs. local evaluation thought; and 3) local comparison vs. either type of pre-stored thought (generalized preference or local evaluation). Each of the three models included the independent variable load as well as variables to capture category effects (see Guadagni and Little 1983) . In the first model, load significantly increased the number of local comparison thoughts (χ 2 (238) = 6.3, p < .01; 28% to 42% under load) and decreased the number of generalized preference thoughts (72% to 58% under load). In the second model, load increased the number of local comparison thoughts (χlocal comparison thoughts (χ 2 (417) = 5.2, p < .02; 16% to 25% under load) and correspondingly decreased the incidence of pre-stored thoughts (84% to 75% under load).
[ Table 1 about here]
Study 1 showed that load decreased the use of pre-stored information. Consistent with our account, load appears to have decreased the importance of factors that involve the retrieval of information from memory and increased the importance of externally available information.
Thus, a key determinant of load's effect on a decision operation appears to be whether that operation is based on pre-stored (in memory) or local (present in the choice set) information.
These results imply that decision-making quality under load will depend more specifically on the relative importance of pre-stored versus local information in constructing decision bias.
Need for Cognition as a Motivational Factor
Study 1 confirmed that load decreases the use of pre-stored information, thereby increasing the use of local information. Thus, when a decision bias involves the neglect of prestored inputs (e.g., preferences for absolute attribute values; see Drolet, Simonson, and Tversky 2000) , we expect load to increase the level of bias. Conversely, when focusing on local inputs (e.g., relative attribute values; see Bodapati and Drolet 2005 ) is appropriate, we expect that load will decrease the level of bias. We extended this reasoning in studies 2-4 by using a motivational variable to indicate propensity to use pre-stored preferential information instead of local relational information. Specifically, we operationalized motivation (i.e., the propensity to bring available cognitive resources to bear on a problem) through need for cognition (NFC). Consumer researchers have regularly used NFC as an operationalization of cognitive resources (e.g., Inman,
McAlister, and Hoyer 1990; Kim and Kramer 2006; Meyers-Levy and Sternthal 1993; Peracchio and Tybout, 1996) . Fundamentally, however, NFC is not an ability variable but a motivational one . It relates to cognitive ability indirectly through its effects on individuals' motivation to engage in different kinds and degrees of deliberation, particularly complex and effortful thinking. Correspondingly, for example, high need for cognition (HNFC) versus low need for cognition (LNFC) people are more likely to process information analytically (Haugtvedt, Petty, and Cacioppo 1992) and show greater preference for verbal, but not visual, information. We proposed that the effects of load on decision bias can be contingent on NFC.
Study 2 tested this proposition by examining the potential moderating role of NFC on the relationship between cognitive load and the compromise effect, a well-known relational bias (Simonson 1989) . In the compromise effect, an option that is non-extreme ("in the middle") on each attribute gains choice share from more extreme alternatives. Because the compromise effect is inconsistent with value maximization (Tversky and Simonson 1993), a manipulation that increases its incidence can be seen as making decisions less normative (i.e., more biased).
We believe that the compromise context is especially well-suited for studying the role of motivation in determining the impact of load on decision bias. Experimental studies imply that there are at least three levels of decision processing that tend to generate different choices in compromise contexts, with the most superficial processing leading to choices that can appear to be due to more thorough processing (e.g., Briley, Morris, and Simonson 2000; Yoon and
Simonson 2007). The simplest solution involves the most superficial (low-level) processing (e.g., lexicographic), and has the consumer just skimming the differentiating attributes and going with the option that is best on the most important attribute ("I'll take the cheapest"). A mid-level solution is more complicated and involves at least some meaningful processing. The consumer chooses the middle option because this option combines both dimensions and resolves decision conflict. While this solution does not require that consumers assess absolute attribute values, it does have them consider both dimensions. Also, to experience decision conflict, the consumer must have some involvement with the decision. The most complicated solution involves highlevel processing. The consumer assesses and elaborates on the personal meaning of absolute attribute values. This involves the recollection of pre-stored information, including information about preferences and goals, as well as fundamental values, product, and market knowledge.
With this solution, consumers may be more likely to "take sides" and not favor the middle option.
People have different baseline processing levels, and we propose that NFC is, in part, an index of baseline propensity to engage in the highest (HNFC) versus the middle (LNFC) level of processing. We propose that the impact of load depends on the processing level "starting point."
We propose that HNFC (vs. LNFC) consumers have a higher starting point. Compromise may be used as a simplifying strategy by LNFC consumers because choices can be made on the basis of compromise without working through specific attribute tradeoffs. Hence, we expect that in baseline (no load) conditions, higher NFC will be associated with the propensity to compromise.
This prediction is consistent with a simple view of NFC as an index of cognitive resource availability, where lower NFC leads to more bias (here, more compromise-based choice).
However, as we develop below, the NFC-as-motivation view implies that there NFC will interact with load.
Study 2 tested NFC as a moderator of the ultimate impact of load on compromise. In view of our reasoning, we predicted that HNFC (vs. LNFC) consumers would compromise less at baseline (no load). We predict that HNFC consumers are more motivated at baseline to process and identify choice solutions based on pre-stored preference information without "compromising." 'Loaded' HNFC consumers will fall back on simpler solutions, such as compromise, since load disrupts their ability to access and use this pre-stored information.
Hence, we expected HNFC consumers to compromise more under load (vs. no load). Contrarily, we predicted that, under load, LNFC consumers may fall back on even simpler strategies, such as lexicographic, since the use of noncompensatory strategies increases with information load (Payne 1976; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1988) . Accordingly, we expected that LNFC consumers may actually compromise less under load (vs. no load). All in all, we predicted that the choice strategies associated with the presence or absence of compromise should differentially interact with the motivation to process (here, NFC), depending in part on consumers' propensity to compromise (relatively higher for LNFC) when under no load. If, as we assume, decision processing becomes simpler under load, HNFC consumers will compromise more under load (because choice based on compromise is simpler than choice based on pre-stored preference information) and LNFC consumers less (because very simple lexicographic choice is even simpler than compromise). The specific hypothesis tested (H1) was:
Hypothesis 1: There will be a crossover interaction between load and NFC on the share of compromise options such that HNFC (vs. LNFC) consumers compromise less at baseline but more under load.
STUDY 2 Method
Three hundred ninety four students at a West Coast university participated in the study, either for a small payment or in exchange for course credit. Participants made choices among three non-dominated product options which were described along two attributes in two categories: portable grill (cooking area and weight) and speakers (price and power). Roughly half the participants received a load manipulation (load condition), whereas the other half did not (no load condition). The load manipulation was the same as that used in study 1. After a series of filler tasks from unrelated studies, participants completed the 18-item NFC scale . In all analyses, we used the continuous measure of NFC. We did so in all studies.
Results and Discussion
Pooling across the products, we created a binary (dependent) variable: "1" if the middle option was chosen and "0" if not. Logistic regression, which included a variable to control for product effects, revealed a significant interaction between load and NFC (χ 2 (394) = 5.47, p < .02). Based on a median split (med. = 5.6), HNFC participants were significantly more likely to compromise under load (51%) versus no load (37.0%) (χ 2 (180) = 3.75, p < .05). In contrast, LNFC participants were less likely to compromise under load (47.6%) versus no load (59.0%), although this effect was marginally significant (χ 2 (184) = 2.49, p < .056, one-tail). See table 2 for the means for LNFC and HNFC participants for each product, separately and pooled. This pattern of results supports H1.
[ Table 2 about here]
We explain this crossover interaction, in part, by reasoning that HNFC consumers are motivated at baseline to go beyond the compromise relation and develop a preference-based choice strategy. Thus, when load disrupts access to preference-based information (as illustrated in the protocols in study 1), it should decrease the abilities of HNFC consumers in particular to go beyond compromise. We also explain this crossover interaction by reasoning that LNFC consumers fall back on even more simplified strategies (e.g., lexicographic) under load. Study 3 used the protocol methodology to test this reasoning. In study 3, we also sought to replicate the two major findings from studies 1-2, the main effect of load on preference-based (vs. local) information and the interactive effect of load and NFC on consumers' reliance on the compromise relationship.
STUDY 3 Method
One hundred and twenty eight students at a West Coast university participated in a consumer decision-making study for course credit. All participants were asked to make choices in the portable grill choice set. The set contained three non-dominated options described on two attributes, cooking area size and weight. There were two versions of the set, which contained different absolute attribute values (i.e., options varied in cooking are size from 250-450 sq. in.
and in weight from 9-15 lb in version 1, whereas options varied between 350-550 sq. in. and in weight from 12-18 lb in version 2). Participants were asked to explain their choice in writing.
About half the participants received the load manipulation whereas the other half did not. On another day, participants completed the 18-item NFC scale .
Protocol Coding. We built on the coding scheme used in study 1 to develop a scheme specific to the portable grill compromise choice problem used in study 3. The tailored scheme similarly measured the degree to which written explanations related to internal, stored information (e.g., goals and preferences) versus more external, relational information (e.g.,
relative attribute values), and subsumed the generalized preference, local evaluation, and local comparison categories (see above).
Two independent judges first evaluated each protocol in terms of whether it did ("1") or did not ("0") contain: a) reference to the decision-maker's own (stored) goals or preferences (e.g., "I would like," "I prefer," and "I need"); b) evaluative implication made in general for cooking size or weight (e.g., "It has to be big in order to cook a lot of food"); and c) reference to their own situation or preferences added to an implication for cooking size or weight (e.g., "A big party at my house requires a lot of cooking area"). Inter-judge reliability was 84%.
Disagreements were resolved through discussion. We summed across the five types of inclusions (i.e., reference to pre-stored preferences, general evaluative implication for size, general evaluative implication for weight, personalized evaluative implication for size, and personalized evaluative implication for weight) to create a six level "own utility" index; index values varied between 0 and 5. Second, because we used compromise stimuli sets, we focused on the use of this particular relational strategy. The judges evaluated each protocol in terms of whether it did ("1") or did not ("0") contain any mention of compromise, the middle position, or a desire for moderation (e.g., "I would like to buy an intermediate-sized grill"). Third, although we did not necessarily expect the relevant processes to be amenable to protocol analyses (see below), we looked for evidence of the use of lexicographic strategies. Judges coded a protocol as evidencing a lexicographic strategy ("1") versus not ("0") if a respondent attributed his or her choice to one attribute only (e.g., "Go with the heaviest").
Finally, coders calculated the number of words contained in each protocol. ANOVA revealed no effects of load or NFC on the number of words contained in each protocol. This null effect is interesting insofar as one might expect differences in word number due to load and/or to NFC. It may be that, because we used a relatively simple choice task, the protocols were all too brief to discern differences. So, in our analyses, we still controlled for the number of words.
by NFC interaction is driven by the motivation to go beyond compromise as a choice strategy, we ran two follow-up studies. 5 In one study (n = 145), we examined the impact of the transparency of the relational information in the choice display. Given our view, varying the degree to which the compromise position is obvious or accessible should alter the degree to which motivational factors such as NFC determine the degree of compromise-based bias. The design of the follow-up study was the same as the design of study 2, but with the addition of a between-subjects transparency manipulation. In the high transparency condition, the display format was the same used in study 2. In the low transparency condition, we manipulated the order of options such that values along attributes were no longer increasing or decreasing steadily from left to right. Further, we described the attribute values for some of the options in the set in words (e.g., twelve pounds) rather than numerically (12 lb.). We found a significant three-way interaction between load, NFC, and transparency (p < .01). In the high transparency condition, we replicated the pattern of results found in studies 2-3. However, in the low transparency condition, there was no interaction between load and NFC. For HNFC participants, obscurity had an effect on compromise similar to that of load, perhaps because they directed effort that would have been spent developing a preference-based strategy to uncovering the relational properties of the choice set.
In a second follow-up study (n = 65), we probed for direct awareness of the impact of reduced resources on the tendency to compromise. We have assumed that HNFC participants are generally aware of the potential for a compromise choice, but elect to go beyond that strategy when cognitive resources are available. Accordingly, HNFC participants should be more aware of load's effects on compromise, compared to LNFC participants, who may be generally less 5 Complete details of the follow-up studies are available from the authors upon request.
aware of the tradeoff between the use of compromise and more resource demanding, preferencebased choice. We showed participants an example of both the load task and the compromise grill problem from study 2. They were told not to remember the load words (described as a "distraction task"), but instead to guess the impact of load on the choice of the middle (compromise) grill. The question asked: "Compared to an undistracted person, would a typical distracted person be more or less likely to choose the middle option (Brand B)?" The response categories were: "less likely," "no difference," and "more likely." The modal response for LNFC consumers was "no difference," whereas the modal response for HNFC consumers was "more likely." NFC was positively associated with a lower tendency to reply "no difference" and a higher tendency to reply "more likely." Indirectly, these results support our assumption that HNFC consumers make a relatively reasoned decision to go beyond compromise at baseline, creating a more complex preference-based strategy, and further can intuit that this ability to go beyond compromise may be reduced by load. LNFC consumers apparently make fewer explicit tradeoffs between use of compromise and other strategies, and presumably because of this, they are less able to intuit the fact that they would compromise less, on average, under load.
STUDY 4
Studies 2-3 focused exclusively on the compromise effect, leveraging participants' assumed knowledge of that effect and thus their ability to go beyond that effect if motivated to do so. Recent research by Yoon and Simonson (2007; see also Simonson 2003 and Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz, and Simonson 2007) indicates that some context effects, such as compromise, are more open to conscious awareness than others, such as the asymmetric dominance effect. Relational factors that are more "perceptual," such as asymmetric dominance, are those that can more easily masquerade as relevant to preferences for absolute attribute values.
Indeed, with respect to the asymmetric dominance effect, consumers appear to be less aware of the tradeoff between choosing based on pre-stored preference information versus choosing based on relational factors. If consumers are unaware of this distinction between choice based on local, relational information and choice based on pre-stored, preferential information, then their relative reliance on each should be driven by ability, rather than motivation. Hence, load's impact on the relative ability to access and use pre-stored preference information should result in a main effect of load increasing asymmetric dominance. Thus, we hypothesized:
Hypothesis 2: Load will increase the asymmetric dominance effect to a greater degree than it increases the compromise effect.
Moreover, we again expected that there would be a significant crossover interaction effect between load and NFC on the choice share of the compromise option (i.e., we expected to replicate our studies 2-3 findings for choice). We did not, however, predict a significant interaction effect between load and NFC for the asymmetric dominance effect. Again, the asymmetric dominance effect is a more perceptual (i.e., System 1 based) decision bias. As argued above, the compromise effect is associated with greater cognitive awareness (Yoon and . Thus, given that NFC is a motivational factor relating to the use of System 2 processes, we expected that the interaction effect between NFC and load would be greater for compromise than for asymmetric dominance. Stated formally:
Hypothesis 3: The interaction effect between load and NFC will be greater for 1989).
The study was a 2 (questionnaire version -between participants) by 2 (load -between participants) by 2 (context effect type: compromise or asymmetric dominance -repeated measure). Thus, there were eight conditions with two repeated measures nested within each.
About half the participants received a load manipulation (load condition) whereas the other half did not (no load condition). The load manipulation was the same used in the previous studies.
Results and Discussion
Logistic regression revealed no main effect of load on choice of the compromise option We ran a comparable set of analyses for asymmetric dominance. In contrast to the results for compromise, there was a highly significant main effect of load on the asymmetric dominance effect (no load = 18.9% and load = 26.7%; χ 2 (756) = 3.73, p < .05). There was no significant effect of NFC (p > .25) or of the interaction between load and NFC (p > .44). Load had a similar increasing effect on asymmetric dominance on both LNFC (no load = 17.9% and load = 27.5%, avg. = 22.7%) and HNFC consumers (no load = 13.8% and load = 27.7%, avg. = 20.7%).
The pattern of results for compromise and asymmetric dominance support both H2 and H3. The main effect of load was greater for asymmetric dominance (where it was significant) than for compromise (where it was not significant). And, the interaction effect between load and NFC was greater for compromise (where it was significant) than for asymmetric dominance (where it was not significant). Overall, these results are consistent with our account, i.e. the degree to which the effects of load are moderated by motivational factors depends on the degree to which the decision bias depends on the input of pre-stored preference information versus local, relational information.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In four studies, we showed that cognitive load alters consumers' use of specific kinds of information, pre-stored preference-based versus local and relational. More importantly, we
showed that the ultimate influence of load on decision bias is contingent on whether consumers are sufficiently motivated to utilize pre-stored information when the ability to do so is unconstrained. In summary, our findings indicate that there is no de facto impact of load on bias,
and that any impact of load will depend on motivational factors, which determine how choice processes would have progressed under conditions of no load.
Our research demonstrates that load can affect choice processes and outcomes not simply by making outcomes worse and processes simpler, but by increasing the weight of local information inputs because pre-stored preference information is less accessible. Load increases or decreases decision bias depending on whether the increased weight of local information inputs leads to more or less bias. Accordingly, our results can be seen as consistent with a selection dual systems view of decision-making (e.g., Sloman 1996). That is, load can be seen as increasing or decreasing the incidence of bias, depending on the System (1 or 2) that generates the bias.
More generally, we believe that a dual-systems model (Evans 2008 ) may be used to help resolve other theoretical and empirical inconsistencies in the consumer behavior literature. For example, a dual-systems model may help integrate the effort-accuracy and perceptual views of decision behavior and bias. The effort-accuracy view is more centered on rule-based (System 2) processes, whether these are normative or heuristic. In contrast, the perceptual view is more centered on automatic, associative (System 1) processes. A contribution of our research, then, is that it develops theory about the interface between automatic and controlled systems in decision strategy selection based on an empirical analysis of the effects of cognitive load on decision bias.
Our research represents an initial step towards integrating the cost-benefit and perceptual views of decision-making (see Bettman et al. 1998 ).
Another contribution of our research is its "reintroduction" of the construct of motivation.
As discussed above, in contrast to traditional dual-systems models like the ELM and HSM (Eagly and Chaiken 1993) , newer dual-systems models have neglected motivation's role in cognitive processing. The findings of our research are broadly consistent with the traditional dual-systems models in that the effects of resource constraints on choice depended on motivation. Consumers who are motivated to disregard relational properties may generate an alternative (perhaps simplified) preference-based strategy under load.
Conversely, consumers who are unmotivated to rely on pre-stored preference information may neglect such information regardless of available resources.
Our research has a number of important implications, which point to some limitations to be addressed in future study. In particular, it has implications for the ongoing debate regarding whether working harder can generally be expected to decrease decision bias. One of the most fundamental questions in consumer behavior is how to encourage consumers to make better decisions. Our research demonstrates that the answer to this seemingly simple question is partly dependent on the consumer's motivation to forgo relational information (e.g., an option's compromise position) in favor of more costly, preference-based decision methods. Relatedly, our research indicates that a thorough understanding of the influence of resource constraints on consumer decision making requires an understanding of the influence of the specific kind of constraint used. In general, consumer researchers have focused on the effects of cognitive resources on consumer reasoning without clearly differentiating among different sources of resource reduction (e.g., Fiske and Taylor, 1982) . They have assumed that cognitive load, time pressure, and problem difficulty (and also low NFC) all have similar effects on decision-making because they have all been associated with reductions in cognitive capacity.
However, our findings in conjunction with others imply that not all resource constraints are equal. Different sources of resource reduction generate different decision processes and decision outcomes. For example, our findings for load differ from Dhar et al.'s (2000) findings for time pressure. In their research, the magnitude of the compromise effect lessened under time pressure.
Our research found no overall effect of load on compromise. Load decreased the compromise effect only for LNFC consumers and increased it for HNFC consumers. Dhar et al. presented evidence that time pressure disrupts consumers' ability to perform detailed comparisons among options in a choice set, thereby making consumers less susceptible to context effects that are due to an excessive focus on local information. This process explanation for time pressure fits well with our process explanation for load among HNFC consumers. Load enhanced the tendency of HNFC participants to focus on local comparisons at the relative expense of pre-stored information, thereby increasing their susceptibility to the compromise effect. However, the process explanation for time pressure does not fit with our process explanation for load's decreasing effect on compromise among LNFC consumers.
Differences such as these underscore our limited understanding of the differences among various determinants of cognitive capacity. Indeed, past studies have mostly tested phenomena where different influences on cognitive capacity generate similar outcomes (e.g., stereotype
activation; see Hilton and von Hippel 1996) . Or, they have examined only one determinant of cognitive capacity (e.g., time pressure, load, or problem difficulty). Presumably, the combined effects of resource constraints is monotonically non-decreasing. In one of our follow-up studies (p. 25), we manipulated load and problem difficulty (by making the relations among options more or less transparent). Reanalysis showed a significant main decreasing effect (11%) of problem difficulty on the compromise effect (p < .05; no load condition). However, load alone did not moderate the effect of problem difficulty. It did moderate the effect of difficulty when NFC was controlled for in the analysis. Accordingly, our research underscores the importance of systematically investigating the underlying effects of different cognitive capacity antecedents and the conditions under which they produce similar or different decision outcomes. 
